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Abstract
New ways of doing things often get started through the actions of a few
innovators, then diffuse rapidly as more and more people come into contact
with prior adopters in their social network. Much of the literature focuses on
the speed of diffusion as a function of the network topology. In practice the
topology may not be known with any precision, and it is constantly in flux
as links are formed and severed. Here we establish an upper bound on the
expected waiting time until a given proportion of the population has adopted
that holds independently of the network structure. Kreindler and Young [38,
2014] demonstrated such a bound for regular networks when agents choose
between two options: the innovation and the status quo. Our bound holds
for directed and undirected networks of arbitrary size and degree distribution,
and for multiple competing innovations with different payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Social and technological advances are essential to economic development, but the
mere existence of new and better ways of doing things does not guarantee that they
will be widely used. The time it takes to dislodge inferior practices is another crucial
factor in explaining how rapidly development can occur. This lag time depends on
several crucial factors. One is lack of information: it may not be immediately evident
that the innovation is in fact superior to the status quo. A second factor is network
externalities: the desirability of an innovation depends not only on its inherent
payoff but on how many others in one’s social network have also adopted. Dislodging
an inferior practice or technology requires a coordinated shift in expectations and
behaviors among members of the group, which may take a long time even if it is
already evident that everyone would be better off if they were to do so.
There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on these issues that we
shall discuss below. In contrast to much of this literature, which is concerned with
learning about payoffs from the actions of prior adopters, our focus here will be on
the time it takes to dislodge an inferior practice when there are increasing returns
from adoption and the payoffs are already known. This allows us to separate the
effects of pure network externalities from the problem of learning about the payoffs
by observing the behavior of others. Moreover, unlike much of the literature, we
shall focus on the question of how long it takes to dislodge an inferior practice or
technology when little or nothing is known about the topology of social interactions.
Although this would appear to omit the main variable of interest, this is not the
case. In particular, Kreindler and Young [38, 2014] demonstrate that the expected
waiting time to overturn an inferior equilibrium can be usefully bounded from above
for all undirected regular networks.
The theoretical contributions of this paper are three-fold. First we establish an
upper bound on the expected waiting time that holds for networks of any size and
degree distribution, whether directed or undirected. Second, we show how to extend
the analysis to multiple competing innovations, instead of a single innovation versus
the status quo, which is the usual assumption in the literature. Third, we show how
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the network topology affects the results by deriving waiting time bounds that hold
for specific classes of networks, including regular networks and star networks. The
mathematical techniques are novel and rely on results characterizing the distribution
of arbitrarily large sums of independent random variables.
1.1 Related Literature
The importance of social interactions in spreading new ideas and practices has been
documented in a wide variety of situations. Ryan and Gross [54, 1943] demon-
strated that farmers’ decisions to adopt an agricultural innovation — hybrid corn –
were strongly influenced by the adoption decisions of their neighbors. Subsequently
Griliches [31, 1957] showed that the decision to adopt also depended on the expected
gains in payoff from the innovation relative to the status quo. At about the same
time sociologists Coleman, Katz, and Menzel [17, 1957] analyzed the role of social
networks among doctors in the adoption of a new medical treatment (in this case
tetracycline), and showed that adoption was driven to a significant extent by peer
effects.1
Since then a substantial theoretical literature has developed on the rate of in-
novation diffusion as a function of the network topology. A recurrent theme is that
interaction among small close-knit groups can speed up the adoption process. The
logic is that the innovation can gain a local foothold relatively quickly, and from
different local footholds it then spreads throughout the network (Ellison [19, 1993];
Young [63, 1998]; and [64, 2009]; Montanari and Saberi [43, 2010]). Experimental
studies of games played on networks are consistent with these predictions (Centola
et al. [15, 2015]).2
A related line of work is concerned with the time it takes for a new idea to
spread when it is seeded at one or more locations. Here the key features are the
1For subsequent empirical work on innovation diffusion in networks, see Valente [58, 1995];
Foster and Rosenzweig [23, 1995]; Foster and Rosenzweig [24, 2010] Kohler [35, 1997]; Kohler et
al. [36, 2001]; Udry and Conley [57, 2001]; Rogers [52, 2003]; Munshi [48, 2004].
2There is also a recent literature on the speed of convergence in games where agents interact
globally instead of with a fixed set of neighbors; see in particular Ellison, Fudenberg, and Imhof
[21, 2016] and Arieli and Young [2, 2016].
3
centrality of the nodes where the new idea is seeded, and the degree of connectivity
of the network (Morris [42, 2000]; Banerjee et al. [6, 2013]). These are instances of
“threshold” models, in which a given individual adopts once a sufficient number of
his neighbors have adopted (Watts [61, 2002]). In this literature adoption decisions
are typically treated as irreversible, whereas in the present paper we treat adoption
(and disadoption) as random variables that depend on the distribution of choices
by one’s neighbors and stochastic shocks to their perceived payoffs; they are not
deterministic.
Yet another branch of the literature investigates how network structure affects
the rate at which agents update their priors about the desirability of the innovation,
based on observation of their neighbors’ choices. A key issue here is the identification
of conditions on the network topology and updating rules under which the process
converges to correct beliefs and optimal actions.3 The actual learning behaviour
of subjects who are embedded in different types of networks has been investigated
experimentally by Gale and Kariv [26, 2003] and Ma¨s and Nax [40, 2016].
In this paper we focus instead on the situation where the payoffs are known
in advance or have already been learned. In particular we assume that people
know that the new practice or technology would be inherently better than current
practice provided that a sufficient number of people in one’s network adopted it. The
source of such network externalities depends very much on the situation. A social
website is more valuable the more people who use it. A market is more valuable
the more traders it attracts. A similar logic holds for communication technologies,
technological standards, and many other innovations with increasing returns.4
A different type of network externality arises when people are sanctioned for not
conforming to a current norm or practice. Demographers have found, for example,
that social norms are a significant factor in explaining the pace and pattern of
3See Banerjee [5, 1992]; Bikchandani et al. [9, 1992]; Ellison and Fudenberg [20, 1993]; Bala
and Goyal [4, 1998]; Jackson [34, 2008]; Solan et al. [56, 2009]; Golub and Jackson [28, 2010]
[29, 2012]; Acemoglu et al. [1, 2011]; Mueller-Frank [46, 2013]; Mueller-Frank and Pai [47, 2016];
Mossel et al. [44, 2015].
4David [18, 1993] and Arthur [3, 1994].
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contraceptive use in developing countries.5 In the United States, norms of medical
treatment for a given medical condition differ widely among states and even among
counties within the same state. These differences appear to be the product of two
types of network externality: peer effects and information sharing. Physicians tend
to conform to the choices of local opinion leaders, and once a given practice becomes
established its benefits are enhanced by local knowledge sharing within the group.6
These and other sources of network externalities can be modelled as a network
game in which individuals repeatedly play a coordination game against their neigh-
bors. Individuals periodically update their choices according to a random arrivals
process. When individuals update they choose an optimal response given the inher-
ent payoff from the choice as modified by the current choices of their neighbors (the
coordination payoff) plus an idiosyncratic utility shock.7
The contribution of the current paper is to establish an upper bound on the
expected waiting time until a given proportion of the population has adopted, where
the bound is independent of the size and topology of the network itself. This result is
similar in spirit to the framework of Kreindler and Young [37, 2013], [38, 2014], who
establish an upper bound on the waiting time for all regular undirected networks and
a logit model of errors. Here we employ different mathematical methods to establish
a more general bound on the waiting time that holds for all directed and undirected
networks of arbitrary size, and for a very broad class of error distributions. These
bounds are especially useful when the network is difficult to observe and is constantly
changing as agents form and sever links with one another.8 The mathematical
techniques rely on recent advances in estimating the distribution of arbitrarily large
sums of independent random variables [22, 2006], [27, 2020].
5See Bongaarts and Watkins [12, 1996]; Montgomery and Casterline [41, 1996]; Kohler [35,
1997]; Kohler et al. [36, 2001]; Munshi and Myaux [48, 2006].
6See Wennberg and Gittelsohn [62, 1973]; Phelps and Mooney [51, 1993]; Chandra and Staiger
[16, 2007]; Burke et al. [13, 2007], [14, 2010].
7See among others Blume [11, 1993]; Jackson and Yariv [33, 2007]; Jackson [34, 2008]; Vega-
Redondo [60, 2007]; Golub and Jackson [28, 2008]; [28, 2010]
8There is a large literature on the dynamics of link formation in social networks. See among
others Skyrms and Pemantle [55, 2000]; Jackson and Watts [32, 2002]; Goyal and Vega-Redondo
[60, 2007]; Jackson [32, 2008].
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A common technique for the analysis of innovation diffusion in large networks is
the mean field approach (see, e.g., [64, 2009]). We use this approach in Proposition
6.1 to derive a tight bound on the expected waiting time in large regular networks.
The mean field approach, however, is not suitable for proving our main result (The-
orem 3.1) which holds even when agents are arbitrarily heterogeneous with respect
to the degree and the influence they exert on one another.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we formulate the stochastic
updating model. In sections 3-4 we establish a general bound on the expected waiting
time until a target proportion of the population has adopted, starting from the state
where everyone is playing the status quo. The bound depends on the shape of the
error distribution, on the payoff gap between the innovation and the status quo,
and on the magnitude of the coordination payoffs relative to the inherent payoffs
from different choices, but it does not depend on the topology of the network per se.
Section 5 extends the analysis to multiple competing innovations. In Section 6 we
show how the waiting time depends on the topology of the network by considering
two contrasting cases: regular networks and star networks. In particular we show
that the bound established by Kreindler and Young [38, 2014] for large regular
networks can be substantially improved.
2 Model
A weighted directed network with m nodes can be represented by an m ✕m row-
stochastic matrix P ❼t➁   ➌Pij❼t➁➑. We interpret Pij❼t➁ as the probability that agent
i interacts with j during the current period.9 Alternatively we can view Pij❼t➁ as
the relative weight that i attaches to interactions with j in the current period. For
expositional simplicity we shall begin by considering the situation where each agent
chooses one of two actions: the innovation (action 1) or the status quo (action 0). In
Section 5 we shall extend the analysis to multiple innovations with different payoffs.
9We allow for the possibility that Pii❼t➁ ❆ 0, that is, i’s own action in the previous period
increases the probability that he chooses it again next period. This can be interpreted as a form
of inertia.
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The payoff from choosing an action consists of two parts: i) an inherent payoff
that is independent of how many others choose it, and ii) a coordination payoff that
results from coordinating with others. For an interaction with a single neighbour,
we represent the payoffs by the following 2 ✕ 2 matrix
0 1
0 c 0
1 a a ✔ c
Here a ❆ 0 is the payoff difference between the innovation 1 and the status quo
0, and c ❆ 0 is the coordination payoff that results from making the same choice
as someone with whom one interacts. Note that when c ❅ a the innovation is a
dominant strategy and there is a unique equilibrium whereas if c ❆ a there are three
equilibria: two pure and one mixed. The subsequent analysis holds in either case
but we shall typically assume that there are multiple equilibria.
The state of the process at the end of each period t is an m-vector s❼t➁ ❃ ➌0,1➑m,
where si❼t➁   1 if agent i chooses the innovation at t, and si❼t➁   0 otherwise.
The updating process works as follows. Time is continuous and the initial state
is s❼0➁   ❼0, . . . ,0➁. We suppose that every agent receives updating opportunities
according to a Poisson arrival process with rate one per time period, where these
processes are independent among the individuals. Suppose that i receives such an
opportunity at time t. Given the current network structure P   P ❼t➁ and the current
state s❼t➁, let
xi❼t➁   ◗
j❃ m✆
Pijsj❼t➁.
Thus i’s expected payoff from interacting with a randomly drawn neighbor (drawn
according the distribution P ❼t➁) is ui❼1➁   a ✔ cxi❼t➁ if he chooses action 1, and
ui❼0➁   c❼1 ✏ xi❼t➁➁ if he chooses action 0.
Let us assume that the difference between the payoff from 1 and the payoff
from 0 is perturbed by a random payoff shock ǫi❼t➁ with c.d.f. F ❼ǫ➁. For ease of
interpretation we shall assume that F has a density f❼ǫ➁ and that all shocks are i.i.d.
among agents and among time periods. If the perturbed payoff difference is positive
agent i chooses action 1; otherwise he chooses action 0. This class of perturbed best
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reply dynamics is very general and includes such standard dynamics as the logit
response, where the payoff shocks are extreme-valued distributed. Experimental
evidence on learning in networks shows that subjects do deviate from best reply
with a probability that is decreasing in the resulting payoff loss, which is consistent
with this class of models (Maes and Nax [40, 2016]).
Conditional on receiving an updating opportunity at time t, the probability that
i chooses 1 is
P si❼t➁   1❙xi❼t➁✆   P a ✔ ǫi❼t➁ ✔ cxi❼t➁ ❆ c❼1 ✏ xi❼t➁➁✆ (1)
  P ǫi❼t➁ ❆ c ✏ a ✏ 2cxi❼t➁✆   1 ✏ F ❼c ✏ a ✏ 2cxi❼t➁➁.
We shall call this the response function and write
r❼xi❼t➁➁   1 ✏ F ❼c ✏ a ✏ 2cxi❼t➁➁. (2)
Note that r❼ ➁ is monotone, nondecreasing, continuous, and 0 ❇ r❼0➁ ❇ r❼1➁ ❇ 1.
(Continuity follows from our assumption that F has a density.) In what follows we
shall assume that r❼0➁ ❆ 0, that is, F ❼c ✏ a➁ ❅ 1. This amounts to saying that even
when none of i’s neighbors has adopted the innovation, there is a positive probability
that i will switch from 0 to 1 due to receiving a sufficiently large payoff shock.
Figure 1 shows an example of a response function based on the normal distribu-
tion.
x
10
1
r❼x➁
Figure 1: A response function based on the normal distribution.
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x1
10
L❼0➁
x   p
Figure 2: Supporting line L❼x➁ (dashed) and response function r❼x➁ (solid).
Although we have derived the response function from a specific shock distribution
F, in what follows we can view the response function as a primitive of the model:
r❼x➁ specifies the probability that an agent chooses action 1 whenever a (weighted)
proportion x of the agent’s neighbors choose action 1. Note that the same response
function holds for all agents and is independent of the particular network through
which they interact.
Given a response function r❼x➁ define the supporting line L❼x➁ to be the unique
line that solves the following maximization problem:
max L❼0➁
subject to L❼1➁   r❼1➁ and L❼x➁ ❇ r❼x➁ for x ❃  0,1✆.
The slope of L will be denoted by 1 ✏ α ✂  L❼1➁ ✏ L❼0➁ ❅ 1, and its fixed point will
be denoted by p   L❼0➁
α
, as shown in Figure 2.10
In what follows we shall focus on the case L❼0➁ ❆ 0. The conditions under which
this assumption holds are discussed in Section 3.1. In particular, it fails to hold if
the response function is too “bowed,” and crosses the 45❳ line at a low value of x
as shown in Figure 3. In this case the adoption process can become trapped in a
low-level equilibrium for a very long time; indeed the expected waiting time until a
low proportion q of the agents have adopted is unbounded in the network size for
10We note that the fixed point p of the supporting line is always smaller than the fixed point of
the response function.
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some classes of networks, as we show in Section 6.3.
x
1
r
1
L❼0➁0 q
r❼x➁
Figure 3: Response function with L❼0➁ ❅ 0, and a low value q such that r❼q➁ ❅ q.
3 A General Result on Waiting Times
The question we wish to address is the following: starting from the state s❼0➁  
❼0, ...,0➁ and given a target proportion q ❃  0,1✆, how long does it take in expectation
to reach a state in which at least qm agents have adopted the innovation? More
precisely, we wish to find an upper bound on the expected waiting time defined as
follows
Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁   E min➌t ✂ 1
m
◗
i❃ m✆
si❼t➁ ❈ q, s❼0➁   ❼0, . . . ,0➁➑✆.
We can now state our main result:
Theorem 3.1. Let F be an error distribution function with density f . Suppose that
the supporting line L❼x➁ satisfies L❼0➁ ❆ 0, has slope 1 ✏ α, fixed point p, and q ❅ p.
Then for every dynamic network P ❼t➁ we have
Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁ ❇ 7.2
pα
❿1 ✔ ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄➄   7.2
L❼0➁ ❿1 ✔ ln❿
p
p ✏ q
➄➄ . (3)
The crucial point is that the right-hand side does not depend on the network
structure or on how rapidly it is evolving.
As we mentioned earlier, the closest result in the literature is due to Kreindler
and Young [38, 2014]. Using martingale methods they derive the following upper
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bound on the expected waiting time until at least qm agents have adopted and P ❼t➁
is any regular, undirected network, namely11
Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁ ❇ 1
α❼p ✏ q➁ . (4)
The same bound holds for irregular networks provided that the target q is ex-
pressed as the degree-weighted proportion of adopting agents. This criterion is
different from insisting that a given proportion of agents adopt. In a star network,
for example, a degree-weighted majority (q   1
2
) is achieved when just the central
node has adopted. A comparison of (3) and (4) shows that the latter is a better
(i.e., lower) bound unless q is very close to p. Indeed (4) is less than (3) provided
that
p
p ✏ q
❆ 7.2❼1 ✔ ln ❽ p
p ✏ q
➂➁,
which holds whenever q ❅ .969p. However, our bound is much more general because
it holds for directed and undirected networks of any size and degree distribution.
In Section 6.1 we show that for large regular networks the waiting time is precisely
1
α
ln❼ p
p✏q
➁, which is considerably tighter than the Kreindler-Young bound. Note,
however, that our general bound (3) is just a linear transformation of the special
bound 1
α
ln❼ p
p✏q
➁ which is tight for regular networks. This result shows that our
bound is of the right order with respect to p and q.
3.1 Discussion of the condition L❼0➁ ❆ 0
A key assumption underlying Theorem 1 is that the tangent line L❼x➁ must have a
strictly positive intercept L❼0➁. If this is not the case the theorem does not apply.
When will L❼0➁ be negative? The answer is when the payoff advantage a is small
relative to the coordination payoff c, and/or the variance of the distribution F is
11To illustrate their approach, let G be a complete undirected network. Given q ❅ p let µ  
L❼q➁ ✏ q. Assuming that L❼0➁ ❆ 0, we have L❼x➁ ✏ x ❆ µ ❈ 0, for all x ❃  0, q✆. Given a proportion
x❼t➁ ❇ q the expected increase next period is E x❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ x❼t➁❙x❼t➁✆ ❈ µ ❆ 0. It follows that the
expected waiting time until x❼t➁ ❈ q is at most 1
µ
. Since L❼x➁   ❼1 ✏ α➁x ✔ αp, µ   α❼p ✏ q➁, and
hence T ❇ 1
α❼p✏q➁
. In fact, the same bound holds for all regular networks; moreover if q   1
2
the
bound can be improved to T ❇ 0.42
α❼p✏q➁
(Kreindler and Young [38, 2014], Lemma 2).
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small. Recall that r❼0➁   1✏F ❼c✏a➁ and r❼1➁   1✏F ❼✏a✏c➁. For ease of exposition
suppose also that f is symmetric about 0, so that the inflection point of F occurs
at 0. Then r❼0➁   F ❼a✏ c➁ and r❼1➁   F ❼a✔ c➁. Increasing a to a✔ b shifts the origin
as shown in Figure 4. When b is large enough, the intercept of the supporting line
become positive (see Figure 4, bottom panel).
The second case is illustrated in Figure 5. Rescaling the standard deviation by
an amount σ is equivalent to rescaling the horizontal axis by 1
σ
, which leads to a
positive intercept if σ is large enough, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5.
More generally, given a response function r❼x➁ we have:
L❼0➁   inf
x❃ 0,1➁
r❼x➁ ✏ xr❼1➁
1 ✏ x
. (5)
Therefore, L❼0➁ ❆ 0 iff r❼x➁ ❆ xr❼1➁ for every x ❃  0,1➁. If r is induced by
a c.d.f. F , then r❼x➁   1 ✏ F ❼c ✏ a ✏ 2cx➁. In this case, the condition becomes
1 ✏ F ❼c ✏ a ✏ 2cx➁ ❆ x❼1 ✏ F ❼✏a ✏ c➁➁ for every x ❃  0,1➁.12
ǫ
1
ǫ   a ✏ c
ǫ   a ✔ c
L❼ ➁
r❼ ➁
L❼0➁ ❅ 0
ǫ
1
L❼0➁ ❆ 0
ǫ   a ✔ b ✏ c ǫ   a ✔ b ✔ c
L❼ ➁
r❼ ➁
Figure 4: For a given c.d.f. F ❼ǫ➁, increasing the payoff advantage of the innovation
by an amount b increases the intercept L❼0➁. Here F ❼a✔b✏c➁   r❼0➁ and F ❼a✔b✔c➁  
r❼1➁.
12In case a ❈ c and the density f is symmetric and unimodal, the response function is concave
and hence L❼0➁ ❆ 0.
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ǫ1
ǫ   a ✏ c
ǫ   a ✔ c
L❼0➁
L❼ ➁
r❼ ➁
ǫ
1
ǫ   a✏c
σ
ǫ   a✔c
σ
L❼0➁
L❼ ➁
r❼ ➁
Figure 5: Increasing the standard deviation of the error distribution by a factor σ
increases the intercept L❼0➁. Here F❾a✏c
σ
➃   r❼0➁ and F❾a✔c
σ
➃   r❼1➁.
3.2 Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.1
Conditional on receiving a revision opportunity, an agent chooses action 1 with
probability r❼x➁, where x is the weighted average proportion of his neighbors who
are currently choosing 1. The idea is to analyse the linear dynamic where an agent
that faces the proportion x updates his action to 1 with probability L❼x➁ instead of
r❼x➁. Since L❼x➁ ❇ r❼x➁, for every time t we have
r❼xi❼t➁➁ ❈ pα ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁◗
j
Pij❼t➁sj❼t➁.
In particular, the expected time it takes for the linear dynamic to reach the threshold
q is at least as long as the expected time under the actual dynamic.
An advantage of analysing the linear dynamic is that it can be viewed as an
imitation dynamic. Namely, at every revision opportunity, the revising agent i acts
as follows: with probability α he chooses his action according to a coin toss with
probability of success p. With probability ❼1 ✏ α➁ he imitates a neighbor that is
13
drawn according to the distribution Pi❼t➁.13 Thus the probability that i chooses 1
is
αp ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁xi❼t➁   L❼xi❼t➁➁. (6)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
time
Agents
Origin agents
Coin-toss agents
Figure 6: The imitation forest of the following history. At time t   1, agent 3
imitates agent 2. At time t   2, agent 4 tosses a coin. At time t   3, agent 2 imitates
agent 4. At time t   4, agent 2 imitates agent 1. At time t   5, agent 3 imitates
agent 2. At time t   6, agent 1 tosses a coin. At time t   7, agent 5 imitates agent
4. Square nodes are points where an agent tossed a coin.
In what follows it will be notationally convenient to analyze the corresponding
discrete time linear dynamic such that at each time t one agent is chosen uniformly
at random to update his action. (This discrete time dynamic is m times slower than
the corresponding continuous time dynamic, where m is the number of agents.)
A history of the imitation dynamic up to time T induces an imitation forest,
which is defined as follows. Each vertex of the imitation forest is a pair ❼i, t➁ ❃
 m✆✕  T ✆. There is an edge from ❼i, t➁ to ❼j, t✏ 1➁ if at time t agent i copied agent’s
j action at time t ✏ 1. In addition, there is an edge from ❼i, t➁ to ❼i, t ✏ 1➁ if i was
not chosen to update at time t. This construction is illustrated in Figure 6.
13This set-up bears some resemblance to the “voter model” in which a randomly drawn agent
imitates a randomly drawn neighbor Liggett [39, 1999]. In our model, by contrast, imitation only
occurs with probability 1 ✏ α; otherwise the agent chooses action 1 with probability p. This leads
to a fully ergodic process whereas the voter model eventually absorbs into the all-0 or all-1 state.
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The imitation forest admits two types of roots. A coin-toss root is a vertex ❼i, t➁
such that i tossed a coin at time t. An origin root is a vertex ❼i,0➁ for i ❃  m✆. This
induces a partition of the population at time t into two groups. A coin-toss agent
is one that belongs to a tree with a coin-toss root. Similarly, an origin agent is one
that belongs to a tree with an origin root.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 consists of two key steps.
Step 1 First we show that the proportion of coin-toss agents increases at a rate
that is bounded below by a simple formula that is independent of the network. This
provides an explicit formula for the expected number of coin toss agents at each
time t. We then apply Markov’s inequality to show that with high probability the
proportion of coin-toss agents is large at all sufficiently large times t.
Step 2 At each point in time the proportion of agents that play 1 is a weighted
average of a sequence of 0✏1 random variables that correspond to prior coin tosses.
Since we allow the network to evolve over time, analyzing these weights is extremely
difficult. Nevertheless, we are able to overcome this hurdle by the following lemma,
which follows readily from Feige’s inequality [22] and its subsequent improvement
by Garnett [27]. (See the Appendix for further details).14
Lemma 1. Let c1, . . . , ck be i.i.d. Bernoulli❼p➁ random variables. For all k and
every sequence of weights β1, ..., βk ❈ 0
P➀ k◗
i 1
βici ❈ ☎◗
i
βi✠p➅ ❈ 0.14p.
This corollary allows us to place a nonzero lower bound on the probability that
a given proportion of the agents are choosing action 1 by time t, which leads to an
upper bound on the expected waiting time to reach a given target proportion q for
any interaction structure.
14Billingsley ([10, 2008], Theorem 9.2) has a different bound that depends on higher moments
of the Bernoulli random variable, but the bound is not as good for values of p close to 1. See
Appendix A for further details.
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4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
As was mentioned in the proof sketch (Section 3.2) we shall analyze the discrete-
time imitation dynamic in which one randomly drawn agent updates per period.
Since each agent’s Poisson clock has rate 1, the discrete process is m times slower
then the actual continuous process. We shall prove that for the discrete dynamic
the expected waiting time satisfies the bound
Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁ ❇ 7.2m
pα
❿1 ✔ ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄➄ .
First we analyze the diffusion of coin-toss agents. Consider the following process:
the initial state is y❼0➁   ❼yi❼0➁➁i❃ m✆   ❼0, ...,0➁, and in each period one player i ❃  m✆
is drawn at random to update. With probability α, yi❼t➁   1, and with probability
1 ✏ α, yi❼t➁   yj❼t ✏ 1➁, where j is drawn according to Pi❼t➁.
Lemma 2. The probability that an agent is coin-toss at time t is independent of the
network structure and is equal to p❼t➁   P❼yi❼t➁   1➁   1 ✏ ❼1 ✏ αm➁t.
Proof. This claim is established by induction on t. For t   0 the claim is trivial.
Assume that the equality holds for t. Than it holds for t ✔ 1, because
P❼yi❼t ✔ 1➁   1➁   1
m
❼α ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁p❼t➁➁ ✔ ❿1 ✏ 1
m
➄p❼t➁
 
α
m
✔ ❿1 ✏ α
m
➄p❼t➁
 
α
m
✔ ❿1 ✏ α
m
➄➀1 ✏ ❿1 ✏ α
m
➄t➅
  1 ✏ ❿1 ✏ α
m
➄t✔1   p❼t ✔ 1➁.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let T˜q be the first time at which at least qm agents have
adopted. We seek to bound E T˜q✆   Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁ from above independently of P ❼t➁.
Lemma 2 shows that the expected number of coin-toss agents at time t is given by
E Pi yi❼t➁✆  m✏m❼1✏ αm➁t. Let us set a threshold of qpm for the number of coin-toss
agents. We use Markov’s inequality to bound the probability that the number of
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coin-toss agents is less than q
p
m, namely,
P ☎◗
i
yi❼t➁ ❅ q
p
m✠   P ☎◗
i
❼1 ✏ yi❼t➁➁ ❆ ❼1 ✏ q
p
➁m✠
❇
E Pi❼1 ✏ yi❼t➁➁✆❼1 ✏ q
p
➁m  
❼1 ✏ α
m
➁t
1 ✏ q
p
.
(7)
At each point in time t, let R❼t➁   ➌r1❼t➁, ..., rk❼t➁❼t➁➑, be the relevant coin-toss
roots at t, and denote by c1❼t➁, ..., ck❼t➁❼t➁ ❃ ➌0,1➑ their realized actions. Note that for
any fixed t, c1❼t➁, ..., ck❼t➁❼t➁ are i.i.d. Bernoulli❼p➁ random variables. For notational
convenience we let c0   0. Let ϕ❼i, t➁ be the function that associates each coin-toss
agent with the corresponding root. Formally, if i is a coin-toss agent at time t and
❼i, t➁ belongs to a tree with root rj❼t➁ then ϕ❼i, t➁   j. If i is an origin agent at time
t we let ϕ❼i, t➁   0. Finally, for every j ❃  k❼t➁✆ we let βj❼t➁   ❙➌i ✂ ϕ❼i, t➁   j➑❙ be
the number of appearances of the coin-toss root j, with the corresponding action
cj❼t➁. Note that Pi❃ m✆ yi❼t➁   Pj❃ k❼t➁✆ βj❼t➁. The state of the dynamic s❼t➁ can be
expressed as si❼t➁   cϕ❼i,t➁, hence Pi si❼t➁   Pj❃ k❼t➁✆ βj❼t➁cj❼t➁.
In order to bound T˜q from above, we define the stopping time
τ ✂ min➌t ✂◗
i
yi❼t➁ ❆ qpm➑,
and the event
❊ ✂  ➌ω ✂◗
j
βj❼τ❼ω➁➁cj❼τ❼ω➁➁ ❈◗
j
βj❼τ❼ω➁➁p➑.
Note that ω ❃ ❊ implies that T˜q❼ω➁ ❇ τ❼ω➁. Since τ is measurable with respect to the
imitation process and ➌c1❼τ➁, . . . , ck❼τ➁❼τ➁➑ are i.i.d. Bernoulli❼p➁ random variables
conditioned on the imitation process, Lemma 1 implies that
P❼❊ ❙τ➁ ❈ 0.14p. (8)
We next show that
E τ✆ ❇ m
α
❿1 ✔ ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄➄ . (9)
Indeed,
E τ✆   ➟◗
t 0
P❼τ ❆ t➁ ❇ ➟◗
t 0
min➐1, ❼1 ✏ αm➁t
1 ✏ q
p
→ ❇ ln ❾1 ✏
q
p
➃
ln ❽1 ✏ α
m
➂ ✔
➟
◗
t 0
❼1 ✏ α
m
➁t
  ✏
ln ❾ p
p✏q
➃
ln ❽1 ✏ α
m
➂ ✔
m
α
❇
m
α
ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄ ✔ m
α
.
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The first inequality follows from (7), and the last inequality from the inequality
ln❼1 ✔ x➁ ❇ x.
By restarting a new imitation process after τ , we can define a sequence of stop-
ping times τ   τ1 ❅ τ2 ❅ ✆, and corresponding sequence of events ❊1,❊2,✆ in the
above fashion. Namely, τi✔1 is the first time at which there are at least
q
p
m coin-toss
agents in the imitation process that starts at time τi, and ❊i✔1 is the event that the
corresponding weighted sum of coin-toss realizations reaches or exceeds its expecta-
tion. Letting i❻ be the first success of one of the events ❊i, we have T˜q ❇ τi❻ . Since
the law of ❼τi✔1 ✏ τi,❊i✔1➁ (conditioned on the history up to time τi) obeys the same
conditions as those of ❼τ,❊➁, the uniform bounds (8) and (9) apply also to the pairs
❼τi✔1 ✏ τi,❊i✔1➁, i   1,2, . . ., conditioned on the history up to time τi. Therefore,
Tq❼F,P ❼t➁➁   E T˜q✆ ❇ E τi❻✆ ❇ 1
0.14p
m
α
❿1 ✔ ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄➄   7.2m
pα
❿1 ✔ ln❿ p
p ✏ q
➄➄ .
Recalling that the actual adoption dynamic with i.i.d. Poisson updating is m times
faster than the discrete time dynamic, the statement of Theorem 3.1 follows.
5 Multiple Technologies
So far we have analyzed the case where there are two competing technologies: the
status quo and the innovation. In practice multiple innovations may be competing
for acceptance at any given point in time. In this section we explain how our results
can be extended to this more general case.
Consider the case where the action set A   ➌1, . . . , k➑ consists of k alternatives,
including the status quo. We shall assume that the payoff matrix U has the following
form:
U  
1 2 ✆ k
1 a1 ✔ c a1 ✆ a1
2 a2 a2 ✔ c ✆ a2
✝
k ak ak ✆ ak ✔ c
Here ai is the utility from choosing technology i and c is the utility from coordina-
tion, which for simplicity we assume is the same for all technologies. (The model
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can also accommodate heterogeneous coordination payoffs but the notation is more
cumbersome.) We shall assume, without loss of generality, that a1 ❆ a2 ❆ ✆ ❆ ak.
Let ǫj be the idiosyncratic payoff shock from playing alternative j. We assume that
the shocks ❼ǫj➁j 1,...,k are nonatomic, i.i.d., and have mean zero.
Given a distribution Ñx   ❼x1, . . . , xk➁ ❃ ∆❼A➁, let ri❼Ñx➁ be the probability that
technology i is the best-reply alternative for an agent facing this distribution:
ri❼Ñx➁   P❼❼U Ñx➁i ❈ ❼U Ñx➁j for all j ❃ A➁.
Let Ñr❼Ñx➁   ❼r1❼Ñx➁, . . . , rk❼Ñx➁➁ denote the multidimensional response function.
For every value x ❃  0,1✆ let ρ❼x➁ be the minimum probability that an agent
adopts technology 1 when the proportion x of his neighbors have adopted technology
1:
ρ❼x➁   min
Ñx❃∆k s.t. x1 x
r1❼Ñx➁. (10)
We replace the function r of the two technologies case with the function ρ. We now
approximate ρ using a linear function L as described above. Note that for every
vector of proportions Ñx,
r1❼Ñx➁ ❈ ρ❼x1➁ ❈ L❼x1➁.
We can therefore use Theorem 3.1 to approximate the expected waiting time until
a proportion q ❅ p have adopted the superior technology 1.
Deriving the function ρ explicitly from the multidimensional response function
Ñr is not always straightforward. However, for a wide class of shock distributions
used in empirical applications, ρ can easily be derived from Ñr, as the following result
shows.
Lemma 3. If the payoff shock distribution F is log concave, then for every x ❃  0,1✆,
ρ❼x➁   r1❼x,1 ✏ x,0, . . . ,0➁.
In other words, if F is log concave, then the technology distribution that mini-
mizes the switching probability to technology 1 across all distributions with x1   x
occurs when the proportion playing technology 2 equals 1 ✏ x.15
15For example, the extreme value distribution, which generates the logit response, is log concave,
and so is the normal distribution, which generates the probit response. In contrast, the Cauchy
and the Pareto distributions are not log concave.
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Before providing the proof note that
U Ñx   ❼a1 ✔ cx1, a2 ✔ cx2, . . . , an ✔ cxn➁.
Proof. Consider the case where the realized payoff shock for technology 1 equals ε1.
In this case the payoff from using technology 1 is u1   a1 ✔ cx ✔ ε1. It is sufficient to
show that across all Ñx ❃ ∆k with x1   x, the vector ❼x,1 ✏ x,0, . . . ,0➁ minimizes the
probability
P❽❼U Ñx➁j ✔ ǫj ❇ u1 for j   2, . . . , k, ➂ (11)
Note that the probability in (11) equals
F ❼u1 ✏ a2 ✏ cx2➁✆F ❼u1 ✏ ak ✏ cxk➁. (12)
We wish to find Ñx ❃ ∆k that minimizes (12) subject to x1   x. It follows from the
log concavity of F that the product in (12) is also log concave. Since the domain,
➌Ñx ❃∆k ✂ x1   x➑, is convex and compact it follows that the minimum is attained at
an extreme point.
It remains to show that the extreme point at which the minimum is attained is
❼x,1 ✏ x,0, . . . ,0➁. We contend that the log concavity of F implies that for every
j ❃ A ✓ ➌1,2➑ the function
g❼z➁   ln❼F ❼u1 ✏ aj ✔ z➁➁ ✏ ln❼F ❼u1 ✏ a2 ✔ z➁➁,
is decreasing in z. To see this, note that u1 ✏ aj ❆ u1 ✏ a2 for all j ❈ 3. Since the
function h❼z➁   ln❼F ❼z➁➁ is concave, the slope
ln❼F ❼u1 ✏ aj ✔ z➁➁ ✏ ln❼F ❼u1 ✏ a2 ✔ z➁➁
a2 ✏ aj
is decreasing in z. In particular, g❼0➁ ❇ g❼✏❼1 ✏ x➁c➁. This implies that for every
j ❃ A ✓ ➌1,2➑,
F ❼u1 ✏ a2 ✏ ❼1 ✏ x➁c➁F ❼u1 ✏ aj➁ ❇ F ❼u1 ✏ a2➁F ❼u1 ✏ aj ✏ ❼1 ✏ x➁c➁.
Therefore, for every j ❃ A ✓ ➌1,2➑
F ❼u1✏a2✏❼1✏x➁c➁F ❼u1✏a3➁✆F ❼u1✏ak➁ ❇ F ❼u1✏a2➁✆F ❼u1✏aj✏❼1✏x➁c➁✆F ❼u1✏ak➁.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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6 The Role of the Network
Our main result shows that, under certain conditions on the payoff shock distribu-
tion, the expected waiting time until the innovation is adopted by a large fraction
of the population is uniformly bounded for all networks of arbitrary size. Moreover,
the bound remains valid even when the network varies over time. In this section
we discuss the role that the network topology plays in the diffusion process when
the network remains fixed. We focus on simple classes of networks such as regular
networks and star networks and demonstrate network-dependent behaviour in these
cases.
We address three closely related questions. First, for regular networks and star
networks, we derive bounds on the speed of convergence that improve on the bound
in Theorem 3.1. Furthermore, we show that for star networks, rapid convergence
holds even for values of q that are greater than the fixed point p.
Second, we study the question of persistence. Once the adoption process reaches
a high proportion q of adopters, how likely is it that the proportion remains high
for an extended period of time? As we shall see, the answer depends on both the
size of the network and its topological structure. When the network is small, it only
takes a handful of agents to revert to playing action 0 for the proportion to drop
substantially below q. Indeed, reversion for any particular agent will occur with
probability at least 1 ✏ r❼1➁, which will typically be positive. Therefore for small
networks we cannot expect that a high proportion of adopters will be maintained
for very long. Even if the network is large, the degree of persistence is sensitive to
the network topology. We shall show in particular that for large regular networks
persistence is high, whereas for large star networks persistence is low (see Section
6.2).
Finally we ask, given a response function r, for which values of q is the expected
waiting time unbounded? The answer depends on the topology of the network. In
star networks the expected waiting time to reach a target q ❅ r❼1➁ is bounded above
for all monotone increasing response functions (Proposition 6.2). In contrast, for
regular networks, the expected waiting time to reach a target q ❅ r❼q➁ increases
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exponentially in the degree of the network (Proposition 6.5).
6.1 Convergence Rates for Specific Networks
We begin by providing an exact formula for the convergence time of the linear
dynamic in large regular networks. An undirected network G is regular if all agents
have the same degree d ❈ 0. As before, for every q ❃  0,1✆, we let Tq❼G➁ be the
expected waiting time until at least the proportion q of the agents have adopted.
Proposition 6.1. Let r❼x➁   L❼x➁   ❼1 ✏ α➁x ✔ αp be a linear dynamic and let
q ❃  0, p➁. For every m ❈ 1 let Rm be an undirected, regular network with m nodes.
Then limm ➟ Tq❼Rm➁   1α ln❼ pp✏q➁.
Proof. We rely on stochastic approximation results due to Benaim [7, 1988] and
Roth and Sandholm [53, 2013]. Let ➌xm,t➑ be the discrete time process representing
the proportion of adopters in Rm at time t. Let ❋t be the sigma algebra that is
generated by the sequence of actions of the agents in Rm up to and including time
t. For any proportion x ❃  0,1✆, let V ❼x➁   α❼p ✏ x➁. We contend that
E❼xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t❙❋t➁   V ❼xm,t➁
m
.
In particular, the expected change in next period’s proportion depends only on the
current proportion and not on the network configuration.
To see this, consider the case where the current proportion xm,t   x and an agent
is selected uniformly at random to revise his strategy choice. With probability α the
selected agent chooses action 1 with conditional probability p, and chooses action
0 with conditional probability 1 ✏ p. With probability 1 ✏ α the agent imitates the
action of a randomly chosen neighbor. Let d❼t➁ be the number of edges i, j where
the actions of agents i and j are distinct. We can write
P xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t   1
m
❙❋t✆   ❼1 ✏ xm,t➁αp ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁
2❙E❙ . (13)
Similarly,
P xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t   ✏ 1
m
❙❋t✆   αxm,t❼1 ✏ p➁ ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁
2❙E❙ . (14)
22
It follows from (13) and (14) that
E❼xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t❙❋t➁   P xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t  
1
m
❙❋t✆ ✏P xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t   ✏ 1m ❙❋t✆
m
 
V ❼xm,t➁
m
.
(15)
Hence for any m and t we can write
xm,t✔1 ✏ xm,t ✏
Um,t✔1
m
 
V ❼xm,t➁
m
, (16)
where Um,t✔1  m❼xm,t✔1✏xm,t➁✏V ❼xm,t➁ is a bounded ❋t✔1-measurable random vari-
able. Furthermore, equations (15) and (16) imply that E❼Um,t✔1❙❋t➁   0. Therefore,
the process ➌❼Um,t➁t➑m satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2.3 in [53, 2013] and we
can use Theorem 3.2 in Roth and Sandholm [53, 2013] to approximate our process
➌❼xm,t➁t➑m by a differential equation as illustrated below.
Let ➌xm❼s➁➑s❈0 be the continuous-time process defined by
xm❼s➁   xm,✡ms✎.
For any x ❃  0,1✆ let zx be the solution of the following differential equation
z˙   L❼z➁ ✏ z   V ❼z➁, z❼0➁   x.
Theorem 3.2 in Roth and Sandholm [53] implies that, for every δ ❆ 0, x ❃  0,1✆ and
T ❆ 0,
lim
m ➟
P❽ sup
s❃ 0,T ✆
❙xm❼s ✔ t➁ ✏ zx❼s➁❙ ❈ δ❙xm❼t➁   x➂   0,
where the limit holds uniformly in x. Note that z0❼s➁   p❼1 ✏ exp❼✏αs➁➁ and for
s➐   1
α
ln❼ p
p✏q
➁ we have z0❼s➐➁   q. In addition, for every x ❃  0,1✆ and every ǫ ❆ 0 we
have zx❼s➐ ✔ ǫ➁ ❆ q. Therefore, for every ǫ ❆ 0, x ❃  0,1✆ and t ❆ 0, limm ➟P❼xm❼s➐ ✔
t ✔ ǫ➁ ❅ q❙xm❼t➁   x➁   0 and hence
lim
m ➟
Tq❼Rm➁   1
α
ln❼ p
p ✏ q
➁,
as was to be shown.
Next we turn to estimating the expected convergence time for large star networks.
Let Sm consist of m vertices with central vertex 1 and edges ➌1, j➑ for all j ❃  m✆
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such that j ❆ 1. We shall show that for every monotone increasing response function,
rapid convergence can hold for values q ❆ p beyond the fixed point.
Let Tq❼Sm➁ be the expected waiting time to reach at least qm adopters in the
star network with m agents.
Proposition 6.2. Consider any star network Sm and an adoption dynamic that is
governed by a monotone increasing response function r ✂  0,1✆    0,1✆. For every
q ❅ r❼1➁,
lim sup
m ➟
Tq❼Sm➁ ❇ r❼1➁❼r❼1➁ ✏ q➁✂
1
r❼0➁ ✔ ln ❽
r❼1➁
r❼1➁ ✏ q ➂✞.
Proof. Consider the following event: agent 1 updates his action to 1 and thereafter
q
r❼1➁m agents receive a revision opportunity. We claim that the expected waiting
time for this event is bounded above by
1
r❼0➁ ✔ ln ❽
r❼1➁
r❼1➁ ✏ q ➂.
Indeed, 1
r❼0➁ bounds the expected waiting time for agent 1 to switch to action 1,
and ln ❽ r❼1➁
r❼1➁✏q
➂ bounds the expected waiting time for at least mq
r❼1➁ agents to have a
revision opportunity (This is an instance of the coupon collector problem; see for
example Section 3.6 in [45]). Note that with probability r❼1➁✏q
r❼1➁ agent 1 is not part of
the fraction q
r❼1➁ of agents who receive a revision opportunity.
Now consider the following event: agent 1 updates his action to 1 and thereafter
at least qm
r❼1➁ of the agents, not including 1, receive a revision opportunity. By the
preceding, the expected waiting time for this event is at most
r❼1➁
❼r❼1➁ ✏ q➁✂
1
r❼0➁ ✔ ln ❽
r❼1➁
r❼1➁ ✏ q ➂✞.
Each of the qm
r❼1➁ agents who receives an updating opportunity chooses action 1
with probability r❼1➁ because during their revision time agent 1 is playing action
1. Therefore, conditional on this event, the probability of reaching a threshold of
q ✏ ε adopters approaches one as m goes to infinity, for every ǫ ❆ 0. This establishes
Proposition 6.2.
We note, in particular, that for a linear dynamic on star networks, the determi-
nant of the fast adoption regime is L❼1➁ and not the fixed point p ❅ L❼1➁. Hence
24
even when q is close to p, the expected waiting time to reach at least qm adopters
is much faster in large star networks than in large regular networks.
6.2 The Persistence of Innovation
In this section we show that innovation is persistent for large regular networks,
whereas it is not persistent for star networks.
Recall that p denotes the fixed point of the linear dynamic. Fix q➐, q ❃ ❼0, p➁
with q➐ ❅ q and consider the expected waiting time for the population to reach a
state with at most q➐m adopters from a state with at least qm adopters. Say that
innovation is persistent for a class of networks if this expected waiting time grows
to infinity with the population size m for any such pair q, q➐.
Formally given a pair q➐ ❅ q ❅ p and a network G, let Iq,q➐❼G➁ be the minimal
expected waiting time to reach a state in which the proportion of adopters is q➐ or
less, where the minimum is taken across all initial conditions with proportion at
least q. We next show that innovation is persistent for the class of regular networks.
Proposition 6.3. Let Rm be a regular network with m agents. For every 0 ❅ q➐ ❅ q ❅
p there exists a constant c   c❼q, q➐➁ ❆ 1 (independent of m) such that Iq,q➐❼Rm, ➁ ❈ cm.
It follows that the expected waiting time until the fraction of adopters is lower
than q➐, starting from a state where the fraction is at least q ❆ q➐, grows exponentially
with the number of agentsm. (The proof is contained in the Appendix). In contrast,
for the class of star networks, persistence fails and the adoption dynamic escapes
from any targeted proportion relatively quickly, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 6.4. Let Sm be a star network with m agents and let r❼x➁ be a response
function with r❼1➁ ❅ 1 and r❼0➁ ❅ 1
2
. There exists a constant c ❆ 0 (independent of
m) such that I
1, 1
2
❼Sm➁ ❇ c.
Thus, even if we start in the state where all agents have adopted, the expected
waiting time to reach a state with a proportion of adopters below 1
2
is bounded
above.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the the proof of Proposition 6.2. Let γ   3✏2r❼0➁
4❼1✏r❼0➁➁ .
Note that since r❼0➁ ❅ 1⑦2 we have γ✏1⑦2
γ
❆ r❼0➁ and γ ❅ 1. Consider the following
event: agent 1 updates his action to 0 and thereafter a fraction γ of agents receive a
revision opportunity. As above the expected waiting time for this event is bounded
above by
1
1 ✏ r❼1➁ ✔ ln ❽
1
1 ✏ γ
➂.
Note that with probability 1 ✏ γ agent 1 is not part of the fraction q
r❼1➁ of agents
who receive a revision opportunity.
Therefore, the expected waiting time of the following event: agent 1 updates his
action to 0 and thereafter a fraction γ of the agents, which does not include agent
1, receive a revision opportunity is
1
❼1 ✏ γ➁✂
1
1 ✏ r❼1➁ ✔ ln ❽
1
1 ✏ γ
➂✞.
Each of the γm agents who receives an updating opportunity chooses action 1 with
probability r❼0➁ because during their revision time agent 1 is playing action 0. By
the choice of γ, there exists a positive probability w ❆ 0 that at most γ✏1⑦2
γ
❆ r❼0➁ of
the γm agents have chosen action 1, independently of m. If this holds the number
of adopters is at most γ γ✏1⑦2
γ
✔ ❼1 ✏ γ➁ ❇ 1⑦2
This shows that
I
1, 1
2
❇
1
w❼1 ✏ γ➁✂
1
1 ✏ r❼1➁ ✔ ln ❽
1
1 ✏ γ
➂✞,
which establishes Proposition 6.4.
6.3 Slow Convergence
A crucial assumption for our main result (Theorem 3.1) is that the supporting line
L❼x➁ of the response function r❼x➁ must intersect the y-axis at a positive value. If
this is not the case, the corresponding imitation dynamic is not well defined. In this
section we ask, given a monotone increasing response function r❼ ➁, when does fast
convergence fail to hold for a given target q? A natural candidate would be any value
of q such that r❼q➁ ❅ q, for then the adoption process gets caught in a bottleneck. In
particular this situation arises when r is convex-concave and is too sharply bowed
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in the convex part (see Figure 3 for an example). Proposition 6.2 shows, however,
that this is not a sufficient condition: star networks exhibit fast convergence for any
value q ❅ r❼1➁. In this section we show that the condition r❼q➁ ❅ q does lead to slow
convergence for large regular networks; in particular, the expected waiting time to
reach such a target q grows exponentially with the degree of the network.
Proposition 6.5. Let Rm be a sequence of undirected dm-regular networks, and let
the response function be monotone increasing with r❼q➁ ❅ q. There exists a constant
c ❆ 0 (independent of m) such that Tq❼Rm➁ ❈ ecdmm .
Proof Idea. Instead of considering the first time τ when the fraction of adopting
agents reaches a threshold q, we study the first time τ˜ where there exists an agent
in the network who has a fraction of at least q adopting neighbors. (The regularity
of the network implies that τ˜ ❇ τ .)
We rely on the fact that prior to time τ˜ , all updating agents in all periods revise
their action to 1 with probability at most r❼q➁. (This follows from the monotonicity
of r.) From the perspective of a single player, his neighbors update their actions
in an i.i.d. manner with probability of success c ❇ r❼q➁. We can therefore deduce
(using Lemma 1 in Benaim and Weibull [8]) that the expected waiting time ro reach
a fraction q of adopters in a dm-regular network with m agents is bounded by
ecdm
m
for some constant c ❆ 0.
Proposition 6.5 does not hold for regular networks of fixed degree d. To see
this, note that for every constant d, the union of m
d✔1
cliques of size d ✔ 1 has the
fast-convergence property. Since the mixing time T of a single clique of size d ✔ 1 is
constant, after time T we will obtain a large number of cliques whose configurations
are distributed according to the invariant distribution, and this fraction will be very
close to the expected fraction under the invariant distribution (i.e., a high fraction
of adopters).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have established an upper bound on the expected waiting time un-
til an innovation is adopted by a large fraction of a given population. The formula
for the bound is universal in the sense that it holds for all directed and undirected
networks of arbitrary size and degree distribution. Moreover the bound holds when
the network itself is evolving over time. Previous results on this topic rely on the
existence of a potential function and hold only for regular networks with symmet-
ric interactions, as in Kreindler and Young [38, 2014]. We have also established
waiting time bounds for the diffusion of multiple innovations instead of just a single
innovation, which is the usual case treated in the literature.
Our bound holds for a wide variety of perturbed best response processes where
agents choose optimal responses under random payoff shocks. Particular cases in-
clude errors that are normally or extreme-value distributed for example. These
models are consistent with empirical evidence on subjects’ learning behavior in net-
work games (Ma¨s and Nax [40, 2016]). The formula for the bound is expressed in
terms of the slope and intercept of a suitably chosen ‘linearization’ of the perturbed
response process. In particular, the expected waiting time to reach a given propor-
tion of adopters is inversely proportional to the initial amount of ‘noise’ in the linear
process when no one has yet adopted (L❼0➁ in expression (3)).
Given more information on the topological structure of the network, one can
obtain significantly tighter bounds on the expected waiting time, as we showed in
Section 6. The usefulness of our main result arises from the fact that in practice it is
very difficult to observe the topology of interactions and the degree of influence that
different actors exert on one another. By contrast, it may be possible to estimate the
response probabilities of agents conditional on the choices of their neighbors using
longitudinal data. From this one can derive the linearized process and the upper
bound on the expected waiting time to reach a given adoption threshold.
A Feige’s Inequality and Lemma 1
The following theorem is due to Feige [22, 2006].
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Theorem A.1. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be nonnegative independent random variables, with
E Xi✆ ❇ 1➛i, and let X   Pni 1Xi. Then for any n,
P X ❅ E X✆ ✔ 1✆ ❈ γ ❆ 0,
for some γ ❈ 1⑦13.
Garnett [27, 2020] improved upon the constant γ and show that γ ❈ 0.14. We
next prove Lemma 1 from the above theorem.16
Proof of Lemma 1. Let c1, . . . , ck be i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), and let β1, . . . , βk be positive
real numbers. We can assume without loss of generality that βi ❇
1
1✏p
for all i ❃  k✆,
and that β1   1⑦❼1✏p➁. Let Xi   βi❼1✏ci➁, mi   βi❼1✏p➁, X  X2✔ ...✔Xk, and m  
m2✔ ...✔mk. We must show that P❼Pi❃ k✆ βici ❈ Pi❃ k✆ βip➁   P❼X1✔X ❇m✔1➁ ❈ γp.
Indeed, by the above theorem,
P❼X1 ✔X ❇m ✔ 1➁ ❈ P❼X1   0➁P❼X ❅m ✔ 1➁ ❈ γp.
A related result due to Billingsley ([10, 2008], Theorem 9.2) says the following:
Theorem. If E❼Z➁   0, E❼Z2➁   s2, and E❼Z4➁   ξ4, then P❼Z ❈ 0➁ ❈ s4
4ξ4
.
To apply this in our setting, let c1, . . . , ck be i.i.d. Bernoulli❼p➁ and let β1, . . . , βk ❈
0. Let Z   Pki 1 βi❼ci ✏ p➁. Note that P❼Z ❈ 0➁   P❼Pki 1 βici ❈ ❼Pki 1 βi➁p➁. The pre-
ceding theorem shows that
P❼Z ❈ 0➁ ❈ p❼1 ✏ p➁❼Pki 1 β2i ➁2
4✂❼1 ✏ 3p ✔ 3p2➁Pki 1 β4i ✔ 3p❼1 ✏ p➁Pi,j✂i①j β2i β2j ✞
.
For values of p that are close to 1
2
Billingsley’s inequality provides a better bound
than the one by Feige and Garnett. However, for p close to 1 the right-hand side is
close to zero whereas the corollary to Feige’s lemma shows that P❼Z ❈ 0➁ ❈ 0.14p. For
certain values of p the bound of Theorem 1.2 can be further improved. Concretely,
16The proof of Lemma 1 was first communicated to us by Terence Tao (see
https://mathoverflow.net/questions/278117/convex-combination-iid-bernoulli-random-variables).
We thank Yuval Peres for pointing out to us the result by Feige [22, 2006].
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a result by Garnett ([27], Theorem 1.2), can be applied to establish the bound
min➌1
6
,
p❼1✏p➁
2❼1✏3p✔3p2➁➑ for p ❈ 12 . This bound is slightly better than 0.14 for p ❅ 0.835.
To see this let X   Pi βi❼p ✏ ci➁. By Garnett’s theorem P❼X ❅ 0➁ ❈ 12c provided
E❼X4➁ ❇ c E❼X2➁✆2 and E❼X3➁ ❈ 0. The latter holds for p ❈ 1
2
. Now E❼X
4➁
 E❼X2➁✆2  
λ1✏3p✔3p
2
p❼1✏p➁ ✔❼1✏λ➁3 where λ   Pi β4i❼Pi β2i ➁2 . Hence we may take c  max➌3, ❼1✏3p✔3p
2➁
p❼1✏p➁ ➑ from
which the bound follows.17 Since we prefer not to limit the range of p, however, the
Feige-Garnett inequality is more useful for our purposes.
B Proofs of Propositions 6.3 and 6.5
Proposition 6.3. Let Rm be a regular network with m agents. For every 0 ❅ q➐ ❅ q ❅
p there exists a constant c   c❼q, q➐➁ ❆ 1 (independent of m) such that Iq,q➐❼Rm, ➁ ❈ cm.
Proof of Proposition 6.3. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we analyze the discrete-
time linear dynamic. Recall that 1 ✏ α   L❼1➁ ✏ L❼0➁, and that s❼t➁ represents the
imitation dynamic: with probability α the updating agent tosses a coin with success
probability p, and with probability 1 ✏ α he imitates a random neighbour.
If we prove that the expected time to reach the fraction q➐ under the discrete-
time dynamic is at least cˆm for some cˆ ❆ 1, then the original dynamic satisfies the
exponential bound cˆm⑦m. (The factor m is a result of changing from discrete to
continuous time.) Note that for all sufficiently small 1 ❅ c ❅ cˆ we have cˆm⑦m ❈
cm, hence the exponential lower bound on the discrete-time dynamic provides an
exponential lower bound on the original dynamic.
Given s❼t➁ ❃ ➌0,1➑m, let z❼t➁   Pi si❼t➁ ❃ N be the number of adopters. We denote
by d❼t➁   ❙➌ i, j✆ ❃ E ✂ si❼t➁   0, sj❼t➁   1➑❙⑦❙E❙ ❃  0,1✆ the fraction of “disagreement”
edges in the graph, where the agents are playing opposite actions.
The process z❼t➁ is a random walk with z❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ z❼t➁ ❃ ➌✏1,0,1➑. We shall
provide an explicit formula for the probability that z❼t➁ moves to the left, to the
right, or stays put. Given s❼t➁ one agent is drawn at random in period t ✔ 1. The
probability is α that this agent tosses a coin. Conditional on the coin toss, the
agent switches from 0 to 1 with probability ❼1 ✏ z❼t➁⑦m➁p. (The first term is the
17We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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probability that he was initially choosing 0, and the second term is the probability
that he updates to 1). With probability 1 ✏ α the agent imitates. Let d❼t➁ be the
number of edges ➌i, j➑ where the actions of agents i and j are different. Then
P z❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ z❼t➁   1❙s❼t➁✆   α❼1 ✏ z❼t➁⑦m➁p ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2. (17)
Similarly we deduce that
P z❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ z❼t➁   ✏1❙s❼t➁✆   α❼z❼t➁⑦m➁❼1 ✏ p➁ ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2. (18)
For z❼t➁ ❃  mq➐,mq✆ the ratio between moving left and right can be bounded by
P z❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ z❼t➁   ✏1❙s❼t➁✆
P z❼t ✔ 1➁ ✏ z❼t➁   1❙s❼t➁✆  
α❼z❼t➁⑦m➁❼1 ✏ p➁ ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2
α❼1 ✏ z❼t➁⑦m➁p ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2 ❇
❇
αq❼1 ✏ p➁ ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2
α❼1 ✏ q➁p ✔ ❼1 ✏ α➁d❼t➁⑦2 ❇
αq ✔ 1
αp ✔ 1
.
We denote this constant by β   αq✔1
αp✔1
❅ 1. Given s❼t➁ with z❼t➁   mq ✏ 1 we want
to estimate the probability that the process will reach the low value z   nq➐ before
it visits z   nq. This question has a precise answer for any biased random walk
with bias β ❅ 1 (see Feller [25] Chapter XIV.2). Namely, if we let n   ❼q ✏ q➐➁m,
the probability of reaching z   mq➐ is β
n✏1
✏βn
1✏βn
, which is bounded above by βn✏1.
Therefore, the expected time until our process reaches z❼t➁   q➐m is at least ❼ 1
β
➁n✏1 ❈
cˆm for some sufficiently small constant cˆ ❆ 1.
Proposition 6.5. Let Rm be a sequence of undirected dm-regular networks, and let
the response function be monotone increasing with r❼q➁ ❅ q. There exists a constant
c ❆ 0 (independent of m) such that Tq❼Rm➁ ❈ ecdmm .
Proof of Proposition 6.5. Consider a dm-regular graph with m agents. Let
τ ✂  min➌ 1
m Pi si❼t➁ ❈ q➑ be the first time such that the fraction of adopters is at
least q. Let τ˜ be the first time such that there exists an agent i with at least dmq
neighbors who have adopted. It follows from the regularity of the network that
τ˜ ❇ τ . We shall bound E❼τ➁ from below by providing a lower bound for E❼τ˜➁.
It follows from the monotonicity of r that, prior to time τ˜ , any agent that updates
his strategy chooses action 1 with probability at most r❼q➁. Thus in order to bound
E❼τ˜➁ from below we can assume that, prior to τ˜ , all agents choose action 1 with
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probability r❼q➁. Assume that at time t ❅ τ˜ the fraction of i’s neighbors that have
adopted lies weakly below r❼q➁✔q
2
. Consider the following two events: (a) at time t✔1
the fraction of i’s neighbors who have adopted lies above r❼q➁✔q
2
; (b) there exists a
time s ❃  t, t✔ 1✆ where the fraction of i’s neighbors who have adopted exceeds q. It
follows from Lemma 1 in Benaim and Weibull [8] that if all neighbors of i choose
action 1 with probability r❼q➁ at every revision opportunity, then the probability
that either (a) or (b) holds is at most e✏cdm for some constant c ❆ 0.
Now assume that the fraction of adopting neighbors of every agent i at time
t ❅ τ˜ lies below r❼q➁✔q
2
. Then the probability that there exists an agent i for which
either (a) or (b) holds is at most me✏cdm . If neither (a) nor (b) holds for every agent
at every time period t   0, . . . , n, then τ˜ ❆ n ✔ 1. It follows that E❼τ˜➁ ❈ ecdm
m
. This
concludes the proof of Proposition 6.5.
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